













dominant	 social	 groups	 are	 often	 in	 a	 state	 of	 ignorance	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 social	
dominance,	where	 this	 ignorance	 is	 explained	 by	 these	 agents'	membership	 in	 a	 socially	
dominant	group	(e.g.,	Mills	2007).	To	illustrate	this	claim	bluntly,	it	is	argued:	1)	that	many	
white	men	do	not	know	the	extent	of	their	social	dominance,	2)	that	they	remain	ignorant	as	
to	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 dominant	 social	 position	 even	 where	 this	 information	 is	 freely	
attainable,	and	3)	that	this	ignorance	is	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	they	are	white	men.	We	
argue	that	on	Buchak's	(2010,	2013)	model	of	risk	averse	instrumental	rationality,	ignorance	






bottom.	 For	 instance,	 a	 2016	 Pew	 Research	 Center	 poll	 found	 that	 only	 50%	 of	 white	
Americans,	 as	 compared	 to	88%	of	Black	Americans,	 believe	 that	Blacks	 are	 treated	 less	
fairly	 than	whites	 in	 interactions	with	 the	 police.1 	However,	 there	 is	 a	 slew	 of	 evidence	











were	 incarcerated”	 (Chetty	 2018,	 p.	 23).	 Relatedly,	 Ross	 (2015)	 finds	 “evidence	 of	 a	






adopt	 a	 harsher	more	 confrontational	 tone	when	 interacting	with	 black	 as	 compared	 to	
white	drivers.	Such	a	pattern	of	findings	suggests	that	there	is	a	disparity	in	the	way	that	
Blacks	and	whites	are	treated	in	the	U.S.	criminal	justice	system	that	is	not	explained	by	other	
potentially	 salient	 factors	 like	 income	 or	 even	 crime	 rates.	 Nevertheless,	 half	 of	 white	
Americans	apparently	do	not	believe	that	such	disparities	exist.	Thus,	a	case	can	be	made	







to	be	any	group	of	 individuals	 that	enjoy	an	advantage	over	others	with	respect	 to	some	
salient	dimension	of	well-being).	First,	very	often	this	ignorance	is	an	impediment	to	political	
decision-making	that	could	begin	to	alleviate	harms	caused	by	social	hierarchies.	Given	that	






those	 in	a	position	 to	arrange	 the	payment	of	 reparations	or	secure	restitutive	 justice	by	





is	not	 in	some	socially	privileged	groups,	to	have	to	 live	 in	a	society	which	systematically	
refuses	to	see	the	plain	facts	about	one’s	lack	of	privilege.	Under	these	conditions,	non-elite	
agents	 feel	 invisible,	 and	 this	 is	 a	 harm	 unto	 itself	 (Ellison,	 1952).	 And	 fourth,	 some	
philosophers	have	argued	that	the	formation	of	racist	beliefs	on	the	part	of	whites	and	others	
at	the	top	of	existing	racial	hierarchies	(which	could	include	the	false	belief	that	one	is	not	
privileged	 in	 virtue	 of	 one’s	 race)	 is	 a	 harm	 unto	 itself	 at	 an	 interpersonal	 level.	 This	 is	
 
3 
distinct	 in	 at	 least	 some	 respects	 from	 the	 insult	 of	 living	 in	 an	 unjust	 society.	 See	Basu	
(2019a,	2019b)	for	arguments	that	racist	beliefs	are	themselves	intrinsically	harmful.	
The	variety	of	ignorance	described	here	is	thus	a	topic	of	interest	for	contemporary	social	










then	 public	 information	 campaigns	 are	 the	 appropriate	 way	 to	 ameliorate	 things.	 And,	
indeed,	many	 organizations	 nowadays	 are	 investing	 resources	 in	 diversity	 and	 inclusion	
trainings,	with	nearly	40%	of	Fortune	500	companies	having	hired	a	diversity	and	inclusion	
executive	since	2015	 (Tonneson,	2020).	We	 take	 it	 to	be	an	 implicit	assumption	of	 these	













of	 situations	 that	privileged	 agents	 in	 an	unjustly	hierarchical	 society	may	plausibly	 face	
wherein	risk	aversion	would	cause	them	to	wish	not	to	gather	more	information.	The	upshot	
of	 these	efforts	 is	an	account	of	elite-group	ignorance	that	represents	agents	who	remain	










this	 ignorance	has	 social	 consequences,	 and	 that	 these	 agents	 cultivate	 said	 ignorance	 at	
least	partially	because	they	benefit	from	inhabiting	a	superior	social	position.	To	this	we	add	








costless.	 One	 of	 our	 primary	 reasons	 for	 relying	 on	 Buchak’s	 formal	 framework	 for	












here,	 is	 the	𝛤-maximin	decision	rule	 for	 imprecise	probabilities	developed	by	Gärdenfors	
and	Sahlin	(1983)	and	defended	by	Seidenfeld	(2004);	see	Bradley	and	Steele	(2016)	for	an	
illustration	of	how	this	decision	rule	admits	failures	of	Good’s	argument.	Since	the	class	of	
















be	 a	 set	 of	 actions	 that	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 fixed	 and	 finite	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 mathematical	














ranking.	 The	 most	 choiceworthy	 action	 is	 the	 action	 with	 greatest	 expected	 value,	 the	
second-most	choiceworthy	action	is	the	action	with	second-greatest	expected	value,	and	so	





















from	 a	 purely	 self-interested	 perspective,	 the	 agent’s	 choosing	 the	 action	 with	 maximal	
expected	value	(or,	in	what	follows,	the	action	with	maximal	risk-weighted	expected	value)	
amounts	to	the	efficient	pursuit	of	self-interest.	However,	should	the	agent’s	value	function	
represent	 the	agent’s	 conative	attitudes	 in	a	way	 that	goes	beyond	an	agent’s	broad	self-
interest	(e.g.,	 the	agent	may	value	outcomes	that	have	no	direct	bearing	on	their	physical	
well-being),	then	the	agent’s	behavior	in	accordance	with	either	standard	or	risk-weighted	
expected	 value	 theory	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 broadly	 instrumentally	 rational,	 although	
perhaps	not	narrowly	self-interested.	We	take	our	arguments	 in	what	 follows	to	apply	 to	
both	of	these	possible	representational	uses	of	an	agent’s	value	function.	
A	famous	result	from	Good	(1967),	which	can	be	read	historically	as	a	corollary	of	earlier	










the	 issue	 is	 not	 whether	 John	 looks	 like	 his	 roommate.	 Rather,	 there	 is	 some	 other	
information	on	the	train	pass	that	will	lead	a	train	conductor	to	become	suspicious	that	John	
is	the	passholder	if	the	pass	is	closely	scrutinized.	For	example,	suppose	that	John	is	older	










































Risk	aversion	 is	a	 type	of	attitude	 that	an	agent	can	have	 towards	a	set	of	actions,	which	
affects	 how	 that	 agent	 ranks	 those	 actions	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 choiceworthiness.	 To	





























On	 Buchak’s	 model,	 risk	 averse	 agents	 form	 a	 choiceworthiness	 ranking	 over	 actions	
according	 to	 the	 risk-weighted	 expected	 value	 (REV)	 of	 each	 action.	 That	 is,	 actions	 are	
regarded	as	more	choiceworthy	 to	 the	extent	 that	 they	have	greater	REV.	The	REV	of	an	
action	 is	 calculated	 as	 follows.	 First,	 for	 a	 given	 action	𝑎 ,	 action-state	 pairs	 are	 ordered	
(𝑎, 𝑠!) ≤ (𝑎, 𝑠") ≤ ⋯ ≤ (𝑎, 𝑠#),	where	the	ordering	is	designed	so	that	𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠!) ≤ 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠") ≤










L𝑠&MN L𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠$) − 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠$'!)M	
A	less	precise,	but	possibly	more	illuminating	way	of	writing	this	equation	is	as	follows:		
𝑅𝐸𝑉(𝑎) = 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠!) + 𝑅L𝑃(𝑠") + 𝑃(𝑠() + ⋯+ 𝑃(𝑠#)ML𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠") − 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠!)M
+𝑅L𝑃(𝑠() + 𝑃(𝑠)) + ⋯+ 𝑃(𝑠#)ML𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠() − 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠")M
+⋯+ 𝑅L𝑃(𝑠#)ML𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠#) − 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑠#'!)M
	
The	risk-weighting	 function	𝑅(⋅)	is	a	 function	 from	the	 interval	[0,1]	into	 the	 interval	[0,1]	
such	 that	 𝑅(0) = 0 ,	 𝑅(1) = 1 ,	 and	 𝑅(⋅) 	is	 non-decreasing.	 If,	 in	 addition	 to	 these	
requirements,	𝑅(⋅)	is	convex,	then	an	agent	whose	choiceworthiness	ranking	over	actions	is	
determined	by	the	risk-weighted	expected	value	of	those	actions	is	said	to	be	risk	averse.	
Although	 it	 is	 tangential	 to	 our	 arguments	 here,	 agents	 with	 concave	 risk-weighting	
functions	will	exhibit	a	preference	for	risk	in	the	way	that	they	rank	the	choiceworthiness	of	
actions.	
To	 illustrate	 how	 this	 works,	 consider	 the	 action	 of	 gambling	 in	 the	 decision	 problem	
modeled	in	Table	2.	The	risk-weighted	expected	value	of	gambling	is	$0 + 𝑅(. 5)($2).	For	any	
convex	 function	𝑅(⋅)	satisfying	 the	other	 constraints	 listed	 above,	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	$0 +
𝑅(. 5)($2) < $1.	 For	 instance,	 if	we	define	𝑅(⋅)	such	 that	 for	all	𝑥 ∈ [0,1],	𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑥" ,	 then	





over	 actions	 that	 demonstrates	 risk	 aversion.	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 will	 show	 how	
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further	that	John’s	risk-weighting	function	𝑅(⋅)	is	such	that	for	all	𝑥 ∈ [0,1],	𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑥".	Note	
that	 this	 change	 in	 risk	 attitudes	 is	all	 that	 changes	 about	 John’s	 epistemic	 and	 conative	
























scrutiny	 system	 is	 biased	 in	 his	 favor	 in	 virtue	 of	 his	 race,	 then	his	 path	 to	 one	 of	 three	
possible	outcomes	will	be	determined	by	what	he	ends	up	learning.	The	worst-case	scenario	
for	John	is	that	he	moves	from	𝛤	to	𝛥	to	E	and	then	ends	up	in	a	world	where	his	ticket	is	







cases	 in	which	an	agent	declines	 to	perform	an	experiment,	or	otherwise	 learn	about	 the	
world,	in	order	to	avoid	receiving	accurate	but	misleading	information.	In	the	case	above,	
John	could	query	whether	the	ticket-checking	process	is	biased	in	his	favor	in	virtue	of	his	
perceived	 race.	 However,	 doing	 so	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 receiving	 accurate	 but	
misleading	 information.	 Specifically,	 if	 it	 turns	 out	 that,	 in	 general,	 the	 ticket-checking	
process	is	biased	in	favor	of	whites,	but	it	is	also	the	case	that	John’s	ticket	will	be	checked,	
then,	prior	to	John’s	boarding	the	train,	the	information	that	white	people’s	tickets	tend	not	
to	 be	 checked	 carefully	 is	 misleading.	 As	 Buchak	 notes,	 said	 information	 is	 both	
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perspective,	 John	 would	 rather	 avoid	 the	 risk	 of	 receiving	 accurate	 but	 misleading	
information	than	take	this	risk	on	in	order	to	possibly	take	a	free	train	ride.	Thus,	he	chooses	
not	to	seek	information	about	his	race-based	privilege	in	the	ticket-checking	process,	and	
take	 the	 safer	 route	 of	 buying	 his	 own	 tickets.	 By	 the	 lights	 of	 Buchak’s	 risk-weighted	
expected	utility	theory,	such	behavior	is	entirely	rational.	
To	underscore	the	role	that	John’s	status	as	a	white	person	plays,	within	the	context	of	this	
model,	 in	 creating	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 such	 that	 he	 ought	 to	 remain	 ignorant	 of	 his	 social	
dominance,	 consider	what	would	happen	 if	 the	 same	scenario	were	 faced	by	a	person	of	
color.	Call	this	person	Kelly.	Even	if	Kelly	has	the	same	value	function	over	money	and	risk	
function	over	probabilities	as	John,	there	are	conditions	such	that	Kelly	would	choose	to	buy	
















neighborhoods	 they	 consider	 important	 to	 patrol,	 a	 stop-and-search	 (or	 stop-and-frisk)	
policy	induces	different	risks	of	actually	getting	caught	for	people	in	different	demographic	
groups.	A	 rational	member	of	an	elite	group,	e.g.,	 a	 rational	white	middle	class	American	
teenager,	 might	 therefore	 be	 such	 that	 if	 they	 looked	 carefully	 into	 the	 data	 on	 police	
behavior	then	they	would	be	 induced	to	take	more	risks,	e.g.,	 they	might	habitually	carry	
around	small	amounts	of	illegal	drugs,	since	it	is	very	unlikely	that	they	will	get	searched	and	










or	 necessarily	 relevant,	 even	 though	 the	 result	 of	 their	 rational	 ignorance	will	 be	 a	 self-
serving	 ignorance	 of	 the	 racist	 conditions	 Black	 people	 live	 with.	 Rather,	 the	 teenager’s	








status	even	when	 the	agent	adopts	attitudes	 that	are	 explicitly	antithetical	 to	unfair	 social	
structures.	For	example,	an	actively	anti-racist	white	person	can,	on	our	model,	still	rationally	





aligned	 their	 sense	 of	 what	 is	 personally	 good	 with	 a	 thoroughly	 anti-racist	 worldview.	






One	 might	 conclude	 from	 this	 that	 such	 an	 agent	 would	 be	 behaving	 both	 morally	 and	
















they	must	work	 to	 become	 less	 risk	 averse,	 or	 else	 change	 their	 valuation	 function	 over	
action-state	pairs	so	that	they	do	not	avoid	information	about	their	relative	privilege	due	to	
risk	aversion.	However,	we	recognize	that	this	reading	of	the	implications	of	our	argument	









white	 ignorance	 highlighted	 in	 recent	 work	 by	 Annette	 Martìn	 (forthcoming).	 Martìn	





process(es)	 that	 systematically	 gives	 rise	 to	 racial	 injustice”	 (Martìn	 forthcoming,	 p.	 12).	
Though	Martìn	argues	 in	 favor	of	a	structuralist	account,	 for	our	part,	we	believe	 that	all	
three	 accounts	 can	 explain	 at	 least	 some	 instances	 of	 white	 ignorance.	 However,	 our	
particular	 use	 of	 risk	 weighted	 rationality	 to	 explain	 elite	 ignorance	 falls	 somewhere	
between	 the	 willful	 ignorance	 and	 structuralist	 accounts.	 By	 showing	 that,	 under	 risk	
aversion,	 agents	will	 avoid	 information	 about	 their	 own	privilege	while	 still	maintaining	
rationality,	we	allow	 for	 rational	 agents	 to	nevertheless	 exhibit	willful	 ignorance	of	 their	
privilege.	At	the	same	time,	we	are	entirely	sympathetic	to	the	idea	that	the	kinds	of	decision	
scenarios	that	are	faced	by	elite	agents	and	which	encourage	ignorance	of	their	privileged	
status	are	produced	by	exactly	 the	 sorts	of	 social	 structural	processes	 that	Martìn	has	 in	
mind.	What	our	argument	here	pushes	back	against	is	the	idea	that	a	cognitivist	account	of	
white	ignorance	can	be	a	panacea	for	explaining	all	cases;	indeed,	our	examples	show	that	
under	 a	 plausible	 model	 of	 rationality,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 the	 maintenance	 of	 white	
ignorance	is	attributable	to	faulty	reasoning.	
To	summarize,	Buchak’s	model	of	instrumental	rationality	for	risk	averse	agents	allows	us	














First,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 empirically	 test	 the	 extent	 to	which	 actual	 agents	 are	willing	 to	
decline	free	information	in	order	to	avoid	receiving	news	that	would	license	riskier	decision-
making.	This	 is	 primarily	 a	 research	program	 for	 experimental	 cognitive	psychology	 and	
experimental	philosophy.	It	is	worth	noting	that	there	are	already	some	promising	results	













groups	 overestimate	 their	 own	 risk	 of	 negative	 consequences	 in	 social	 situations	where	
different	salient	groups	tend	to	experience	highly	unequal	outcomes.	
Regarding	 this	 second	 avenue	 for	 empirical	 research,	 there	 is	 already	 some	 promising	
evidence	 from	 empirical	 criminology	 and	 sociology	 that	 is	 suggestive	 of	 a	 general	
phenomenon	in	which	people	who	have	not	previously	engaged	in	risky	behavior	(especially	












shell	 of	 illusion	 is	 certainly	 consonant	 with	 our	 explanatory	 model,	 stronger	 evidential	
support	would	be	provided	by	studies	 showing	 that	effect	of	 the	shell	of	 illusion	 is	more	





must	 be	 the	 case	 that	 members	 of	 socially	 dominant	 groups	 typically	 rank	 the	
choiceworthiness	of	possible	actions	in	a	risk	averse	way.	One	may	doubt	that	this	condition	
holds.	Indeed,	one	could	argue	that	privileged	agents	typically	have	a	risk	seeking	attitude	
towards	 possible	 choices,	 such	 that	 a	member	 of	 a	 dominant	 social	 group	may	 prefer	 a	





















more	 to	 give	 themselves	 the	 possibility	 of	 making	 some	 gain.	 One	 can	 note	 that	 in	 our	







by	agents,	 John	 is	 likely	 to	be	risk-seeking.	 In	 fact,	 the	decision	 to	 learn	 that	 the	scrutiny	
process	is	biased	in	favor	of	whites	is	closer	to	cases	where	Abdellaoui	et	al.	(2013)	have	
found	financial	professionals	to	be	risk	averse;	namely,	those	cases	in	which	agents	face	a	
likely	 gain	 and	 an	 unlikely	 loss.	 Indeed,	 the	 central	 claim	 of	 our	 paper	 is	 that	 that	 risk	
aversion	can	explain	white	 ignorance	 in	cases	where	knowledge	of	one’s	privilege	would	
potentially	 license	taking	actions	 that	have	a	high	probability	of	a	modest	gain	and	a	 low	
probability	 of	 significant	 loss.	 This	 coheres	 with	 the	 predictions	 of	 Prospect	 Theory,	 as	
formulated	 by	 Kahneman	 and	 Tversky	 (1979).	 All	 this	 leads	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 our	









































see	Cherry	2020).	 Further,	 evidence	of	 one’s	 racial	 privilege	may	be	highly	disturbing	 to	
perceive.	 The	 video,	 taken	 in	 2020	 by	 Darnella	 Frazier,	 of	 George	 Floyd	 being	 killed	 by	
Minneapolis	police	officer	Derek	Chauvin	is,	for	many,	clear	evidence	of	racial	inequalities	in	
the	treatment	of	individuals	by	the	police,	and	yet	many	who	view	the	video	are	horrified	
simply	 in	 virtue	 of	 witnessing	 someone	 being	 violently	 killed.	 Scenes	 of	 poverty	 and	
desperation	can	also	be	inherently	upsetting	to	many	people,	independently	of	whether	they	
also	constitute	evidence	of	unfair	material	inequalities.	Once	one	acknowledges	these	real	
costs	 to	 consuming	 information	 about	 one’s	 privilege	 as	 a	 member	 of	 a	 systematically	
advantaged	 group,	 ignorance	 of	 said	 privileged	 status	 by	members	 of	 that	 group	 can	 be	
modelled	as	a	rational	decision	without	appeal	to	risk	aversion.	
We	respond	to	this	line	of	objection	by	agreeing	that,	in	many	cases,	agents	do	indeed	turn	
down	 information	 because	 of	 the	 psychological	 or	 emotional	 costs	 associated	 with	
processing	that	information.	However,	our	model	still	shows	that	if	risk	attitudes	are	taken	
to	be	an	irreducible	input	to	an	agent’s	rational	decision-making	processes,	then	there	are	
cases	 such	 that	 even	 if	 an	 agent	manages	 to	 condition	 themselves	 so	 as	 not	 to	 incur	 an	
emotional	or	psychological	cost	to	processing	evidence	of	social	inequality,	that	agent	will	
still	avoid	information	about	their	relative	privilege	within	said	social	inequalities.	Thus,	if	





attitudes	 can	 explain,	 in	 some	 instances,	 ignorance	 among	 elites	 as	 to	 their	 own	 relative	
privilege.	Moreover,	recent	work	in	experimental	psychology	(see	Landy	et	al.	2018,	Ivuoma	
et	 al.	 2020)	 provides	 some	 empirical	 support	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 false	 beliefs	 about	






strategies	 for	 alleviating	 elite-group	 ignorance.	 In	 particular,	 it	 shows	 that	 psychological	






good	 reasons	 for	 agents	 to	 be	 generally	 risk	 averse),	 our	 model	 is	 such	 that	 rational	
incentives	 to	avoid	evidence	of	one’s	privilege	 can	exist.	This	 suggests	 that	 strategies	 for	





To	explain	this	more	fully,	 there	 is	a	prima	facie	plausible,	 if	somewhat	optimistic,	 line	of	
argument	 that	 runs	 roughly	 as	 follows:	 if	 ordinary	 members	 of	 elite	 groups	 simply	
understood	the	extent	of	the	inequality	that	existed	in	society,	then	they	would	put	in	place	
measures,	at	both	a	personal	and	political	level,	to	help	eliminate	these	inequalities.	Thus,	
the	 line	 of	 argument	 concludes,	 anti-inequality	 efforts	 should	 be	 focused	 on	 educating	
people,	 especially	 those	 at	 the	 top	of	 social	 hierarchies,	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 inequality	 in	




biases	 or	 historical	 obstacles	 to	minority-group	participation.	Our	work	 here	 shows	 that	
even	if	it	is	true	that	members	of	elite	groups	would	do	more	to	combat	inequalities	if	they	
knew	 about	 them,	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 that	 anti-inequality	 efforts	 should	 be	 focused	 on	
educating	or	otherwise	intervening	on	the	psychological	states	of	members	of	elite	groups.	
This	is	because,	according	to	our	model,	members	of	elite	groups	acting	in	their	own	rational	
self-interest	may	actively	avoid	 information	about	 their	own	privileged	position	 in	 social	
hierarchies,	such	that	these	education	efforts	would	be	more	costly	than	perhaps	 initially	
realized.	This	is	all	consistent	with	acknowledging	that	 if	one	could	just	press	a	button	to	
bring	 about	 greater	 knowledge	 on	 the	 part	 of	 hiring	 committees	 or	 one’s	 academic	
colleagues	 of	 the	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 some	 groups,	 then	 of	 course	 one	 should	 press	 the	
button.	
However,	 risk	 averse	 elite	 agents	 can	 be	 faced	with	 the	 possibility	 that	 if	 they	 are	more	










or	 selected	 by	 members	 of	 various	 elite	 groups,	 and	 may	 exhibit	 and	 thus	 perpetuate	
ignorance	about	the	stark	material	inequalities	that	give	rise	to	the	very	need	for	them.	And	








Note	 that	 nothing	 about	 this	 argument	 requires	 that	 agents	 consciously	 and	 explicitly	
calculate	their	rational	self-interest	in	avoiding	information	and	acting	accordingly.	Rather,	
if	 the	 models	 of	 risk	 averse	 reasoning	 used	 in	 this	 paper	 can	 in	 fact	 accurately	 predict	
behavior,	then	the	fact	that	they	allow	for	information	avoidance	is	politically	significant.	An	
agent	 who	 has	 picked	 up	 the	 habit	 of	 checking	 out	 when	 presented	 with	 potentially	
uncomfortable	information	about	racism	or	misogyny,	or	who	just	reliably	fails	to	actually	
integrate	what	they	are	being	told	into	their	broader	worldview,	could	well	be	instantiating	
the	sort	of	 rational	 information	avoidance	we	are	concerned	with	here.	What	we	wish	 to	
stress	is	not	the	individual	malfeasance	of	agents	finding	ways	to	ignore	the	information	they	
have	available,	but	that	in	so	far	as	this	behavior	is	rational	from	the	point	of	view	of	risk	







the	 account	 of	white	 ignorance	developed	by	Mills	 is	motivated	by	 a	 desire	 to	provide	 a	
needed	 dose	 of	 realism	 to	 the	 social	 epistemological	 frameworks	 developed	 by,	 among	
others,	Kitcher	 (1994),	Kornblith	 (1994),	and	Goldman	(1999).	That	 is,	Mills	 is	aiming	 to	






















apartheid-era	South	Africa),	agents	are	 likely	 to	be	certain	about	 the	existence	of	various	
advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 possessed	 by	 people	 who	 share	 their	 socially	 salient	
characteristics.	Under	these	conditions	of	explicit	social	hierarchy,	our	analysis	of	elite-group	






inequalities	 (perhaps	on	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 standard	of	 reasonableness	 is	 fairly	 low).	














the	scientific	problems,	the	research	agendas,	 for	standpoint	theories,	 [...]	 [t]hinking	from	




world	 around	 them”	 (1992,	 p.	 451).	 In	 our	 case,	 we	 begin	 with	 the	 historical	 and	
contemporary	 reality	 of	 elite-group	 ignorance,	 especially	 relevant	 to	 our	 focus	 has	 been	
white	 ignorance,	 before	 investigating	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 fact	 of	 elite	 group	
ignorance	and	the	theory	of	rational	decision	and	risk	aversion.	More	generally,	reflecting	on	
and	 refining	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 used	 to	 inform	 and	 formulate	 the	 claims	 of	
historicized	inquiry	is	an	important	part	of	the	collective	endeavor	of	research.	
This	discussion	provides	an	additional	opportunity	to	clarify	our	aim	in	this	paper.	We	do	






behavior	 is	 to	 show	 that	 such	 behavior	 is	 in	 fact	 permissible	 within	 an	 independently	
plausible	normative	 theory	of	 instrumental	 rationality.	To	perform	 its	 task	such	a	 theory	
must	 be	 sufficiently	 connected	 to	 everyday	 experience	 that	 it	 can	 plausibly	 describe	
important	aspects	of	 real	decisions,	but	retain	enough	distance	 from	actual	events	 that	 it	
retains	 genuinely	 critical	 potential	 -	 i.e.,	 the	 ability	 to	 normatively	 appraise	 events	 by	
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We	 produce	 here	 not	 a	 reconstruction	 of	 Good’s	 theorem	 itself,	 but	 rather	 a	 detailed	
explanation	 of	 how	 the	 value	 of	 information	 is	 calculated	 in	 a	 standard	 expected-value	
framework,	 and	 Good’s	 key	 result	 that	 value	 of	 information	 is	 always	 positive	 for	 free	
information.	The	decision	to	seek	free	information	is	modelled	as	follows.	Assume	that	an	
agent	 that	 deliberates	 between	 a	 set	 of	 actions	𝐴 	and	 has	 a	 value	 function	𝑉(⋅) 	over	 the	






















unconditional	 expected	 value	 is	 denoted	 as	 argmax+∈-𝐸𝑉(𝑎) .	 Thus,	 if	 an	 agent	 that	




which	 element	 of	𝑋 	the	 actual	 world	 is	 in.	 Recall	 that	 the	 agent’s	 value	 function	𝑉(⋅) 	is	
defined	over	the	product	space	𝐴 × 𝑆.	Recall	further	that	if	the	agent	learns	that	the	actual	
world	is	in	𝑥* ,	then	they	will	perform	argmax+∈-𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑎|𝑥*).	Thus,	if	the	the	actual	world	is	
in	𝑥* 	and	𝑠$ 	and	an	agent	learns	that	the	actual	world	is	in	𝑥* ,	then	that	agent	will	perform	
argmax+∈-𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑎|𝑥*)	and	 receive	 the	 payoff	𝑉(argmax+∈-𝐶𝐸𝑉(𝑎|𝑥*), 𝑠$).	 However,	 if	 the	
actual	world	is	in	𝑥* 	and	𝑠$ 	and	the	agent	chooses	not	learn	the	which	element	of	𝑋	the	actual	























































the	actual	world	 is	 in	and	 the	expected	value	of	acting	without	 learning	 this	 information.		
Good	 (1967)	 shows	 that	 𝑉𝑂𝐼(𝑋) 	cannot	 be	 negative.	 Thus,	 an	 agent	 who	 ranks	 the	
choiceworthiness	of	actions	according	to	expected	value	theory	will	never	regard	learning	






using	 his	 roommate’s	 pass	 is	 . 52($0) + .42(−$250) = −$105 .	 Thus,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
information,	he	will	buy	a	ticket,	incurring	a	cost	of	$50.	The	conditional	expected	value	of	
each	action	when	the	actual	world	is	biased	or	not	biased	is	as	follows:	
𝐶𝐸𝑉(Use	Roomate’s	Pass|Biased) = .9($0) + .1(−$250) = −$25	
𝐶𝐸𝑉(Buy	a	Ticket|Biased) = −$50	




will	 buy	 a	 ticket.	 In	 the	 mathematical	 notation	 introduced	 above,	













$0	 −$50	 −$250	 −$50	













𝐸𝑉(Learn𝐵) = 𝑃(Biased,No	Scrutiny)($0) + 𝑃(Not	Biased,No	Scrutiny)(−$50)






𝐸𝑉(Learn𝐵) = .9(. 2)($0) + .5(. 8)(−$50) + .1(. 2)(−$250) + .5(. 8)(−$50) = −$45	
Given	 that	 the	 expected	 value	 of	 not	 learning	whether	 the	 train	 pass	 scrutiny	 process	 is	
biased	in	favor	of	whites	is	−$50,	John	should	pay	up	to	$5	to	learn	this	information.	Good’s	
result	shows	that	choosing	to	learn	which	element	of	a	given	partition	the	actual	world	is	in	
will	always	have	non-negative	value	by	the	 lights	of	Savage’s	decision	theory.	Thus,	 if	 the	





Prior	 to	 learning	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 racial	 bias	 in	 train	 security,	 the	 risk-weighted	
expected	value	 for	 John	of	borrowing	his	roommate’s	 train	pass	 is	−$250 +. 52"($250) =
−$182.4.	Thus,	in	the	absence	of	information,	he	will	buy	a	ticket,	incurring	a	cost	of	$50.	The	
risk-weighted	 conditional	 expected	 value	 (RCEV)	 of	 each	 the	 two	 actions	 that	 John	
deliberates	between,	given	his	learning	that	the	ticket	scrutiny	process	is	or	is	not	biased	in	
favor	of	whites,	is	given	by	each	of	the	following	equations:	
𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑉(Use	Roomate’s	Pass|Biased) = −$250 +. 9"($0 − −$250) = −$47.5	
𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑉(Buy	a	Ticket|Biased) = −$50	








pass	 inspection	 is	 again	 represented	by	Table	4.	However,	 John’s	 risk-weighted	expected	
value	of	learning	whether	or	not	there	is	bias	in	train	pass	inspection	differs	from	his	risk-
neutral	 expected	 value	 of	 learning	 this	 same	 information.	 This	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 the	
following	calculation:	







𝑅𝐸𝑉(Learn𝐵) = −$250 + (.9(.2) + .5(.8) + .5(.8))"(−$50 − −$250)
+(.9(.2) + .5(.8))"(−$50 − −$50) + (.9(. 2))"(0 − −$50) = −$56.30
	
Since	the	risk-weighted	expected	value	of	not	learning	𝐵	is	−$50,	under	risk	aversion,	John	
would	pay	up	to	$6.30	to	avoid	information	about	bias	in	the	train	security	process.	
